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COMMENTARY
NATO and Georgia 13 years on: So close, yet
so far
In this special series of Commentaries, EPC analysts look to NATO’s new strategy for 2030 and outline what must be
done to ‘make a strong alliance even stronger’.
Georgia has bent over backwards to prove to NATO that it is a steadfast partner and ready to join the Alliance.
Yet Russia’s de facto third-party veto hinders NATO’s open-door policy and Georgia’s eventual membership.
There should be no Russian doorman deciding who enters the NATO club.
At the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, Georgia and Ukraine were promised seats at the Alliance’s table. 13 years on, this
has still not materialised, despite Georgia ticking all the boxes on NATO’s to-do list. In fact, Tbilisi is better prepared
than some of the Alliance’s newest members (https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2019-nato-70-rea�rming-alliances-
values-general-report-schmidt-132-cds-19-e-rev-1-�n) – and yet a Membership Action Plan (MAP) remains elusive.
While  some  Alliance  members  fear  Russia’s  reaction,  this  approach  gives  Moscow  a  de  facto  veto  power  over  a
sovereign country’s decision and undermines NATO’s credibility. At the forthcoming NATO summit, the Alliance must
stand behind its values and ensure European security by demonstrating a genuine open-door policy. It should rea�rm
Georgia’s eventual place in the club and move its membership process forward.
So close…
Georgia  is  an  important  and reliable  NATO partner.  (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm)  Today,
relations far exceed the MAP framework (https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-membership-georgia-us-and-
european-interest). They consist of political dialogue under the NATO-Georgia Commission and practical cooperation,
giving Tbilisi the necessary tools to meet NATO standards and obtain membership without a MAP. This includes the
Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), which aims to strengthen Georgia’s military capability, including advancing
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its territorial defence and boosting security sector reform. In addition, the Annual National Programme sets policy and
reform priorities. Georgia is also an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, which provides all  the privileges that Alliance
members enjoy barring the collective security umbrella. Strengthening Georgia’s resilience to Russian coercion has also
been a crucial part of NATO’s engagement with Georgia.
Tbilisi has worked hard. It has contributed more to international NATO missions (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/topics_38988.htm) than many existing members while also meeting the Alliance’s 2% defence spending target. Georgia
was  the  largest  non-member  contributor  per  capita  to  NATO’s  Resolute  Support  Mission  in  Afghanistan.  With  its
defence capabilities  and interoperability  with  NATO members’  armies,  its  military  standards meet  those of  NATO.
Georgian  popular  support  for  membership  (https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-eu-and-nato-support-�ve-year-
high-georgia-urgent-action-environment-and) also remains very high, at 78%.
In  addition  to  upholding  NATO standards,  national  trends  reveal  (https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2019-nato-70-
rea�rming-alliances-values-general-report-schmidt-132-cds-19-e-rev-1-�n)  that  Georgia  is  “catching  up  with  current
NATO members in international ratings that assess the level  of  media freedom, the rule of law, and the business
environment.”  Transparency  International’s  Corruption  Perception  Index  (https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi
/2020/index/nzl)  ranks  Georgia  45th,  while  members  Montenegro  and  North  Macedonia  are  67th  and  111th
respectively.
…and yet so far
Despite Georgia’s readiness and ful�lment of NATO’s membership criteria, the Alliance remains reluctant to put MAP on
the table. This raises concerns in Tbilisi – and other aspirant countries – that NATO’s open-door policy is selective.
NATO claims that Russia does not possess a de facto third-party veto, citing the accession of Montenegro and North
Macedonia as proof of its open-door policy. Russia did indeed oppose the accession of both states – but they cannot be
compared to Georgia. Firstly, neither country borders Russia. Secondly, Russia has no military presence in either. Lastly,
the integration of the Western Balkans into NATO and the EU has long been seen as necessary to prevent renewed
con�ict in the region, and therefore vital for European security.
It’s complicated
Georgia’s case is more complicated – and not just because it borders Russia. Russia occupies two regions of Georgia,
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali  Region (South Ossetia),  which in turn are deeply integrated with Russia.  The Kremlin also
maintains a large military presence in each occupied territory, which it uses to project its power. Still, as NATO’s policy
makes clear, the resolution of territorial disputes is a factor to be considered when evaluating a potential member’s
suitability, not a precondition.
In NATO history (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/o�cial_texts_24733.htm), members have joined the Alliance with
outstanding irredentist claims, omitting the disputed territories from the collective security umbrella provided under
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Examples include Spain, Ceuta and Melilla; or pre-reuni�cation Germany. There
are also numerous examples of NATO members that do not have all their territory under the protection of Article 5,
including the US (Guam, Hawaii), the UK (Falkland Islands) and France (Réunion Island).
Former  NATO  Secretary-General  Anders  Fogh  Rassmussen  (https://twitter.com/AndersFoghR/status
/1171361985906298880?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1171361985906298880%7Ctwgr
%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F1tv.ge%2Fen%2Fnews%2Fanders-fogh-rasmussen-i-suggest-to-break-
stalemate-around-georgia-nato-membership%2F)  proposes a  similar  approach in  the case of  Tbilisi:  “Georgia  could
discuss joining NATO without Article 5 coverage of illegally occupied territories. It  would show Russia that creating
frozen con�icts can’t forever freeze Georgia’s future.”
Don’t poke the Russian bear
The biggest stumbling block for Georgian accession is Russia. France and Germany are particularly opposed, fearing
that it  would trigger a hostile  response from the Kremlin.  In 2008,  German Chancellor  Angela Merkel  warned the
Alliance that Russia would interpret any further eastward expansion of NATO as an existential threat. Four months
later, Russia invaded Georgia, coming within a few miles of Tbilisi.
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Today, Russia occupies 20% of Georgian territory. Russian military adventurism (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications
/EURussia-relations-Adding-insult-to-injury~3cfb54) elsewhere – its 2014 annexation and occupation of Crimea, the war
in Ukraine’s Donbas region (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Donbas-Ukraines-continuing-predicament~31a114), its
expanding military footprint in the Black Sea – has heightened anxieties about pursuing further rounds of NATO’s
eastern enlargement. Despite NATO’s claims, by creating arti�cial con�icts and freezing them, Russia has created a de
facto third-party veto right in NATO’s decision-making process regarding the open-door policy.
What to do?
All NATO members should understand that the current policy of keeping Georgia in limbo undermines the Alliance’s
credibility and reinforces the Russian narrative that the West does not want Georgia. Short of a sea change in Russian
thinking, Moscow will continue to view NATO as a threat, regardless of who sits in the Kremlin.
This should not mean that NATO backpedals on its commitment to Tbilisi. Georgia is as much a part of the transatlantic
community as those states with which it stood shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan and elsewhere. At the forthcoming
June summit,  the Alliance should reiterate its  commitment to Georgia by moving ahead with the accession.  There
should be no new modus vivendi with Russia: Moscow must not be allowed to veto the accession of Georgia or any
other NATO aspirant simply because it claims that they are part of its sphere of in�uence.
In its pursuit of NATO membership, Tbilisi has done everything the Alliance has asked and more. Concerns over Russia
must be balanced with consideration of the wider contribution Georgia makes to transatlantic security. Given Tbilisi’s
pro-Western  policies,  commitment  to  transatlantic  security,  and  steps  taken  to  strengthen  its  democracy  –  in  a
signi�cant geostrategic region where democracy is in short supply –, NATO should double down on its support for
Georgia.
At the upcoming NATO summit, heads of state should underline the Alliance’s �rm recognition of Georgia’s progress in
the context of the open-door policy, reiterate that the country will become a member and clearly spell out the next
steps. When it comes to Georgia’s MAP, NATO can either grant it and a membership invitation simultaneously or scrap
the MAP entirely and declare at any given moment that Georgia has been admitted to the club.
Georgia still has homework to complete, too. Despite NATO’s promise and Georgia’s considerable reforms, Tbilisi still
needs to go the extra mile. It will have to go far beyond what other NATO candidates had to do to persuade Germany,
France and other sceptical NATO members of its value. Namely, Georgia will not only have to press ahead with the
reforms asked by NATO. It will also have to ful�l those demanded by the EU, aiming to further strengthen the country’s
resilience  to  internal  and external  threats  (i.e.  countering  political  polarisation).  Tbilisi  should  fully  implement  the
provisions  foreseen  in  the  April  2021  deal  that  was  mediated  by  the  EU  and  ended  the  recent  political  crisis
(https://epc.eu/en/publications/Georgias-road-ahead-Time-for-the-EU-to-show-some-tough-love~3e7c18).  With
Georgia’s transatlantic allies monitoring this process closely, the country’s political elites should not waste any more
time squabbling and knuckle down instead.
The Georgian government should also acknowledge that it is willing to join the Alliance without including Abkhazia or
the Tskhinvali Region under the protection of Article 5 as long as they have not been returned to Georgia. With the
support of the EU, US and other partners, Georgia should double down on strengthening peacebuilding e�orts with
Abkhazians and South Ossetians.
The  “NATO  2030  (https://www.nato.int/nato_static_�2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Re�ection-Group-Final-
Report-Uni.pdf)” food-for-thought document, which will  be on the table during the June summit, states that “NATO
should […] strengthen partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia as vulnerable democracies that seek membership”. NATO
must follow through on this recommendation by demonstrating that it has a genuine open-door policy. There should
be no Russian doorman deciding who enters the NATO club. By rea�rming Georgia’s eventual membership, NATO will
send a strong signal to the region that di�cult reforms do pay o� and simultaneously strengthen its credibility vis-à-vis
the Kremlin.
Iana Maisuradze is a Programme Assistant of the Europe in the World programme.
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